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INTRODUCTION
Federal tax law unduly limits nonrecognition treatment of triangular
mergers, the most important acquisition form used in the United States.1
The law is internally inconsistent and difficult to understand. The poor state
of the rules has real costs to parties involved in corporate acquisitions, who
must sacrifice business gains to account for federal tax constraints. This
Article explains the genesis of the problem over the one-hundred-year
history of our income tax as a byproduct of reciprocal state–federal
responsiveness to changes in law and business climate, and offers
corrections based on pragmatic and normative views of corporate
acquisitions.2 It argues that difficulties in the taxation of triangular mergers
are a microcosm of larger structural problems in corporate tax law—
namely, difficulties created by conflicting conceptualizations of corporate

1

The heavy use and importance of triangular mergers has long been a featured subject of well-used
practitioner manuals. See, e.g., EDWIN L. MILLER, JR., MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: A STEP-BY-STEP
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDE 84 (2008); ANDREW NUSSBAUM et al., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 473
(2012).
2
When recommending changes to the taxation of triangular corporate acquisitions, we assume
continued double taxation of corporate profits and continued recognition of corporations as taxpayers
separate from their shareholders.
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personhood and Congress’s inability to nimbly respond to changes in
business.
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code focuses heavily on the
form of corporate transactions rather than on their substance, thus enabling
businesses to lodge novel substance within existing forms. This occurs
when federal law gives high regard to state law characterizations of
business forms, their governance, and their life cycle, or when it leaves
terms integral to the operation of the Internal Revenue Code—such as
“merger”—open for interpretation by the states. Additionally, ossified
features of federal tax law, like the dichotomy between taxation of
partnerships and corporations, leave gaps in the statutory structure that
create opportunities for state innovation.3 Since Congress cannot respond to
such changes nimbly, the Treasury and the IRS are left to employ guidance,
regulatory and otherwise, in unanticipated ways.4 Over time, and
particularly in the area of corporate acquisitions, events such as these have
filled federal tax law with complexity and hidden meaning.
Triangular merger provisions perfectly encapsulate the problem.
Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code is the quintessential form-driven
tax statute, but Congress cannot predict every new form. Triangular
mergers were not included in § 368. Yet, the transaction’s many state law
benefits, such as the isolation of debt and the preservation of target
attributes like state licensures and contracts in place, made it both useful
and popular, putting pressure on the existing statute.5 The IRS’s initial
refusal to grant nonrecognition to triangular forms, combined with relevant
Supreme Court precedent, eventually led to additional complexity in the
law.6 As the Treasury and the IRS, through rulings and regulations,
responded to taxpayers’ attempts to circumvent the prohibition, the law
became a thicket.7 At the same time, triangular acquisitions became an
increasingly large part of acquisition practice. Because it acted ex post
rather than ex ante to address the evolution of corporate practice,
Congress’s new legislation was path dependent. Rather than write a new
law on a clean slate, it added to existing law and analogized new
transactions to old ones. As a consequence, when triangular merger
legislation was eventually enacted, it was similarly bound to form at the

3

For instance, the creation of the limited liability company (LLC) clearly was unanticipated by the
drafters of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
4
The “check-the-box” regulation is a good example of this. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2012).
See generally Heather M. Field, Checking In on “Check-the-Box,” 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451 (2009)
(analyzing the successes and failures of “check-the-box” regulations); Philip F. Postlewaite, The Checkthe-Box Regulations Turn 10—Will We Survive Their Teen-Age Years?, 6 J. TAX’N GLOBAL
TRANSACTIONS 35, 53 (2006) (describing “check-the-box” regulations as “problem children”).
5
For a description of the transactional benefits of triangular mergers, see Part II.A.
6
For a description of the development of tax law on triangular mergers, see Part I.
7
See Part I.
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expense of substance.8 As a result, complexity increased and tax neutrality
decreased, yet the law remains ill equipped to face new challenges like
LLC conversion statutes and mergers with single-member LLCs.9 And so
the cycle begins again.
Our recommendation for the next one hundred years, then, is that
corporate tax statutes be minimalist. Corporate tax statutes should
communicate Congress’s core normative positions rather than rely on laws
and transactional forms that may be altered by outside actors. For corporate
acquisitions, this could be accomplished by a lean embodiment of the
realization requirement focusing on attributes common to all transactions
rather than on unique elements that are perceived to create dividing lines
between categories of transactions. Summarized colloquially, the problem
with the past one hundred years of § 368 is that for sophisticated taxpayers,
lines are made to be blurred.
Part I of this Article describes the history of federal taxation of
triangular corporate acquisitions, noting that the tax’s current status is a
result of both path dependency and Congress’s search for consistency.
Part II highlights inefficiencies arising under current rules, including a
notable lack of tax neutrality among merger forms. Part III proposes
revisions made within the constraint of double taxation of corporate profits.
Part IV concludes that these solutions are normatively unsatisfying in light
of larger structural problems within acquisitions and corporate taxation
generally. This Article concludes that, in its next one hundred years,
corporate tax law should abandon form-based rules for substance-based
standards,10 allowing the federal government flexibility to address
inevitable yet unpredictable changes in both the form and substance of
business transactions.
I.

VIEWING THE EVOLUTION OF TRIANGULAR REORGANIZATIONS AS A
FAILED SEARCH FOR CONSISTENCY
Questions about the taxation of corporate reorganizations are as old as
the Internal Revenue Code itself. Do they generate income, and if so,
should the income be taxed or should it be granted nonrecognition? Under
a nonrecognition regime, an acquiring corporation is not taxed on gain
8

See Part I.
For instance, the law does not address “functional mergers” that occur when a parent corporation
acquires a target, converts it to a single-member LLC under state law, or elects to have it treated as a
disregarded entity, causing the Treasury to request comments from the tax bar. See Linda Z. Swartz &
Richard M. Nugent, Big A, Little C: Baby Steps Toward Modernizing Reorganizations, 140 TAX NOTES
233, 233–34 (2013).
10
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561–62
(1992) (“One can think of the choice between rules and standards as involving the extent to which a
given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or left to an enforcement authority to
consider.”).
9
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generated by trading its appreciated stock for stock or assets of the target;
the target is not taxed on gain arising from its receipt of assets or stock
from the acquirer in exchange for its own stock or assets; and the target’s
shareholders are not taxed on gain arising from their receipt of acquiringcorporation stock in exchange for their target stock.11
Although nonrecognition of potentially taxable income from a
corporate reorganization was not codified until 1918, the Treasury set an
early precedent by granting nonrecognition to reincorporations under an
innovative state statute that allowed out-of-state corporations to move to
Delaware, where corporate and franchise tax rates were lower.12 Congress’s
eventual adoption of statutory nonrecognition for corporate reorganizations
arrived in 1918.13 Enacted against the backdrop of a high individual income
tax and a wartime economic boom, the original nonrecognition statute had
no agreed-upon purpose but many plausible defenses.14 Among them was a
desire not to tax transactions that occurred only on paper and the hope that
nonrecognition would spur business activity.15 Still others saw it as a
compromise between competing ideas of consumption-based and accretionbased taxation.16 These justifications have remained durable, even though
reorganizations are no longer (or never were) purely on paper and despite
the existence of conflicting empirical evidence about the effect of
nonrecognition on decisions to reorganize.17
Against this background, we consider the genesis and justification of a
particular kind of reorganization: the triangular merger, which involves not
only a target and acquiring corporation, but also an acquisition subsidiary.
Three traditional acquisitive reorganizations—corporate mergers, stockfor-stock acquisitions, and stock-for-asset acquisitions—may use a
11

See I.R.C. § 1032 (2012) (no gain or loss to acquirer on receipt of property in exchange for stock
of acquirer or acquirer’s parent); id. § 361 (no gain or loss to target corporation in reorganizations); id.
§ 354 (no gain or loss to shareholders of target if target stock is exchanged for acquirer stock or stock of
acquirer’s parent in reorganization).
12
Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Story of the Corporate Reorganization Provisions: From “Purely Paper”
to Corporate Welfare, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 27, 38 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005).
13
Id. at 43.
14
Id. at 52.
15
Id.
16
See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2000)
(“[T]he original reorganization provision evidences a compromise between the accretion and
consumption tax models.”). See also Charlotte Crane, Toward a Theory of the Corporate Tax Base: The
Effect of a Corporate Distribution of Encumbered Property to Shareholders, 44 TAX L. REV. 113, 142
(1988) (arguing that prior to 1986, the scope of the corporate tax base was indeterminate); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of Realization, in TAX STORIES: AN INDEPTH LOOK AT THE TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES 53, 56–57, 95 (Paul Caron ed., 2003)
(“[T]he realization concept in general encourages, at a minimum, a hybrid income/consumption tax
because it provides a rationale for the many consumption aspects of the income tax.”).
17
See Mehrotra, supra note 12, at 30 n.14 (citing conflicting studies of the effect of nonrecognition
on corporate and shareholder decisionmaking).
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subsidiary as the nominal acquirer.18 More recently, Congress added two
more: forward and reverse triangular mergers.19 These five transactions
were legislated ex post to play catch up with the evolution of business
transactions and state and foreign laws on liability and corporate
management.20 All five accomplish the same goal: the use of parent stock in
a corporate acquisition that involves a parent acquirer, a target, and the
parent’s subsidiary. However, each has its own set of complex criteria.21
Normative justifications for the existence of multiple tax
categorizations of triangular transactions22 are in short supply. Worse yet,
the transactions are complex and overlap with one another, causing one
scholar to call them “a Penelope’s web.”23 As a prelude to our proposal to
collapse these transactions into a single tax-neutral regime that better
reflects the reality of modern deal making, the following paragraphs outline
the evolution of triangular reorganizations with a focus on path dependency
and tax nonneutrality. We begin with the three traditional acquisitive
reorganizations—statutory mergers,24 stock-for-stock acquisitions,25 and
stock-for-asset acquisitions26—and we conclude with forward and reverse
triangular mergers.27
A. Triangular Drop-Down, B, and C Acquisitions
1. Drop-Down Acquisitions.—The Internal Revenue Code describes
three classic forms of tax-preferred acquisitive reorganizations: A, B, and
C.28 In a traditional A reorganization, a target corporation merges into the
acquiring corporation under state law, leaving former target shareholders in
possession of the acquirer’s stock.29 The B reorganization allows the
acquiring corporation to exchange the target shareholders’ stock for the

18

See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012).
Id. § 368(a)(2)(D)–(E).
20
See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 33 (4th ed. 2012)
(discussing the evolution of transaction forms).
21
See § 368(a).
22
See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
23
See Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging Penelope’s Web, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 1335, 1337 (1985). “An outstanding feature of this statutory scheme is the great amount of
overlap existing among these definitions.” Id. at 1386. As Professor Posin notes, corporate tax law has
even been likened to living organisms. Id. at 1337 (citing Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of
Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 93 (1977)).
24
§ 368(a)(1)(A) (describing A reorganizations).
25
Id. § 368(a)(1)(B) (describing B reorganizations).
26
Id. § 368(a)(1)(C) (describing C reorganizations).
27
Id. § 368(a)(2)(D)–(E) (describing A reorganizations, forward triangular mergers, and reverse
triangular mergers).
28
Id. § 368(a)(1).
29
Id. § 368(a)(1)(A); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251 (2001).
19
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acquirer’s stock.30 Finally, in a C reorganization, the acquirer uses its stock
to obtain “substantially all” of the target corporation’s assets.31 Each form
is subject to a continuity of business enterprise (COBE) requirement, which
is satisfied when the acquirer either continues at least one significant line of
the target’s historic business or uses a significant portion of the target’s
assets in its business conduct.32 In addition, each must satisfy the continuity
of proprietary interest (COI) requirement,33 which is satisfied when 40% of
the compensation received by the target’s shareholders consists of acquirer
stock.34
Historically, the COBE and COI requirements created a bar to
triangular reorganizations, even to transactions where the acquirer
transferred the target’s assets or stock to a subsidiary.35 Use of a subsidiary
as the acquisition vehicle, but parent stock as consideration, meant that
target shareholders would have no proprietary interest in the acquirer. This
concern over COI led the Supreme Court to hold in Groman v.
Commissioner36 and Helvering v. Bashford37 that the existing statutory
regime did not allow an acquisition subsidiary to use parent stock to
acquire a target’s assets, nor did it allow target assets to pass through the
parent into a subsidiary tax free. Congress disagreed and legislatively
overruled the Court’s decisions. Legislators agreed that tax-preferred status
should be given to such transactions even if the transaction used the
parent’s stock, and even if the parent did not have direct ownership of the
acquired corporation following the transaction.38 In short, it intended to
30

I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
32
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c)–(d) (2011).
33
Id. § 1.368-1(e).
34
See id. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v) ex. 2; LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420–21 (1940) (target
shareholders’ receipt of long-term bonds classified as equities was insufficient because shareholders
had no proprietary interest in acquirer); John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935)
(preferred stock represents a continuing interest); Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 385–86
(1935) (target shareholders’ receipt of cash and common stock was sufficient continuing interest);
Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933) (receipt of short-term notes was
insufficient because they were not an incident of ownership).
35
See Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 454–55, 458 (1938) (no COI where wholly owned
subsidiary of parent acquired target stock); Groman v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 82, 88–90 (1937) (no
continuity where parent acquired target assets and dropped them into wholly owned subsidiary);
Standard Realization Co. v. Comm’r, 10 T.C. 708, 714–15 (1948) (no COBE where assets were
transferred to shareholders in liquidating distribution even though shareholders immediately transferred
them to a subsidiary because eventual acquirer did not carry on any part of acquired corporation’s
business and transfer to subsidiary was done for the purpose of selling assets).
36
302 U.S. at 88–90 (no continuity where parent acquired target assets and dropped them into
wholly owned subsidiary).
37
302 U.S. at 458 (no COI where wholly owned subsidiary of parent acquired target stock).
38
See PHILIP J. LEVINE ET AL., COMMENTS REGARDING TRANSFERS OF ASSETS FOLLOWING
PUTATIVE REORGANIZATIONS 6 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pub
policy/2004/040526ct.pdf.
31
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give corporations more latitude in choosing tax-favored reorganizations.39
Toward that end, Congress enacted new legislation to permit a parent to
transfer its newly acquired target assets or stock to a subsidiary,40 as
occurred in Groman.41 So long as the other requirements of the Code are
met, these transactions are afforded nonrecognition treatment.42
2. Triangular C Reorganizations.—Congress addressed the Bashford
case in 1954 by adding triangular C reorganizations to the Code.43 In a C
reorganization, the acquirer uses its voting stock to obtain “substantially
all” of the target’s assets.44 The target typically distributes the stock to its
shareholders in dissolution.45 Afterward, the former target shareholders
own shares of the acquirer, which holds the target’s assets.46 In the
triangular form of this transaction, the acquirer transfers its own voting
stock to a subsidiary, and the subsidiary exchanges its acquirer stock for the
target’s assets.47 The acquirer must use voting stock to acquire at least 80%
of the value of the target’s assets, but any assets in excess of that amount
can be purchased for cash, debt, or other consideration.48 In addition, the
acquirer in a C reorganization must obtain “substantially all” of the target’s
assets.49 “Substantially all,” a term of art, is not defined by the Code but is
instead bounded by court decisions and a regulatory safe harbor.50
According to the IRS, this requirement is met if the acquirer obtains 90%
of a target’s net assets and 70% of its gross assets.51 Strangely, this
39

See id. at 6–7. For further discussion of this point, see MARTIN D. GINSBURG ET AL., MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS ¶ 701.2.1 (2013).
40
See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub.
L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 120.
41
See S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 82–83 (1964) (explaining the proposed amendment allowing the use
of parent stock in acquisition of target stock by subsidiary permitted in B reorganization); S. REP. NO.
83-1622, at 51–52 (1954) (explaining the proposed amendments allowing acquirer in A, B, or C
reorganization to drop stock or assets into controlled subsidiary and allowing the use of parent stock in
acquisition of assets by subsidiary in C reorganization).
42
See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 51–52.
43
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 83D CONG., SUMMARY OF
H.R. 8300: THE PROPOSED INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 33–34 (Comm. Print 1954). The report, citing Groman and Bashford, expressly
states that the law was proposed to “eliminate[] a formality of existing law.” Id.
44
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2012).
45
See id. § 368(a)(2)(G).
46
See id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
47
See id.
48
See id. § 368(a)(2)(B).
49
Id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
50
See, e.g., Comm’r v. First Nat’l Bank of Altoona, Pa., 104 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1939) (86% of
the net value is substantially all); Arctic Ice Mach. Co. v. Comm’r, 23 B.T.A. 1223, 1228 (1931) (68%
of the net value is not substantially all); see also Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 (1977) (providing
regulatory safe harbor).
51
Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 569.
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requirement reappears in the reverse triangular merger,52 which is the
structural equivalent of the B reorganization.
3. Triangular B Reorganizations.—In 1964, Congress added yet
another category of nonrecognition acquisition: the triangular B
reorganization.53 In B reorganizations, the acquirer exchanges its stock for
target stock.54 At the conclusion of a traditional B reorganization, the
acquirer holds the target as a subsidiary, and the target’s shareholders
become shareholders of the acquirer.55 In a triangular B reorganization, the
acquirer transfers voting stock to a subsidiary, and the subsidiary swaps
acquirer’s stock for target stock.56 Afterward, the former target shareholders
own shares of the acquirer, which owns shares of the acquisition
subsidiary, which owns shares of the target.57 Unlike C reorganizations,
both the straight and triangular B reorganizations are notable for their strict
prohibition on consideration other than voting stock (colloquially referred
to as “boot”) and their requirement that the acquirer have control of the
target at the close of the transaction.58 In this context, control is defined as
“ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock” of the target.59
In the report accompanying its enactment of triangular B
reorganizations, Congress revisited triangular C reorganizations and noted
the similarity between triangular C and triangular B reorganizations.60 The
report went on to say that if COI is satisfied in triangular C reorganizations,
it must also be satisfied in triangular B reorganizations since there is little
substantive difference between stock and asset acquisitions.61 With
enactment of the triangular B reorganization, Congress essentially sought
parity between the stock and asset acquisition methods.62
B. Triangular Mergers
The structural and tax results achieved in triangular B and C
reorganizations can be reached through a second set of provisions in the

52

See § 368(a)(2)(E).
LEVINE ET AL., supra note 38, at 6 n.5.
54
§ 368(a)(1)(B).
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
Id.
59
Id. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (c).
60
S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 82–83 (1964).
61
Id. at 83.
62
See id. The report also claimed allowing Triangular B reorganizations would have only
negligible effects on government revenue. Id.
53
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Code.63 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress enacted statutes
describing forward triangular mergers64 and reverse triangular mergers.65
Prior to the adoption of these statutes, an acquirer could not use a merger
subsidiary to acquire a target corporation in exchange for acquirer stock;66
nonetheless, it was still possible to achieve the end result of both the
forward and reverse triangular mergers indirectly.67 Congress’s report on
forward triangular mergers pointed out that a parent’s acquisition of a
target’s assets through a merger followed by contribution of those assets to
a subsidiary produced the same result for all purposes relevant to taxation.68
The report explained enactment of forward triangular mergers by
analogizing them to triangular B and C reorganizations69 and found no basis
for denying the same treatment in the case of statutory mergers.70 Congress
opined that while forward triangular mergers were not initially provided
because lawmakers did not think that companies wanted them,71 as the
country’s business climate evolved, “it [was] desired to have an operating
company merged into an operating subsidiary in exchange for the stock of
the parent holding company.”72 As a result, Congress found no reason to
deny nonrecognition simply because the acquirer did not acquire the target
company’s assets directly.73
In 1971, Congress enacted reverse triangular mergers.74 A Senate
report justified their adoption on the same grounds given for forward
triangular mergers; namely, their emergence in business and their similarity
to preexisting nonrecognition transactions.75 The report again focused on
consistency. Having created forward triangular mergers, it would be
63

See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(2)(D) (describing forward triangular mergers), (a)(2)(E) (describing reverse
triangular mergers).
64
See S. REP. NO. 90-1653, at 3 (1968).
65
See S. REP. NO. 91-1533, at 1 (1970).
66
Id.
67
See id. at 1–2; S. REP. NO. 90-1653, at 2. For a description of these transactions, see M. Carr
Ferguson & Martin D. Ginsburg, Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAX L. REV. 159, 172 (1973).
68
S. REP. NO. 90-1653, at 2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 90-1902, at 2 (1968) (explaining how the
results of a triangular merger could be obtained indirectly).
69
S. REP. NO. 90-1653, at 2–3. These analogies perpetuated questionable distinctions between
triangular B and C forms.
70
Id. at 2.
71
See id.
72
Id. At the time, state merger and reorganization laws were more relaxed as they “permitted a
controlled subsidiary to consummate a triangular statutory merger with another corporation through the
use of its parent’s stock.” 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 12-92 (7th ed. 2000).
73
See S. REP. NO. 90-1653, at 2.
74
See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2077; S. REP. NO. 91-1533, at 1–2 (1971).
75
See S. REP. NO. 91-1533, at 1–2; see also S. REP. NO. 90-1653, at 1–2 (1968) (explaining that
tax-free forward triangular mergers were attainable indirectly through existing provisions of I.R.C.
§ 360).
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nonsensical for Congress to refuse nonrecognition to reverse triangular
mergers.76 The report noted possible business and legal reasons, aside from
tax advantages, for an acquirer to structure a deal as a reverse triangular
merger. For example, in contrast to the forward triangular merger, in a
reverse triangular merger an acquirer can preserve the target’s corporate
identity.77
Although the Senate acknowledged that acquiring corporations could
achieve this same outcome through B reorganizations,78 the report deflected
the argument that B reorganizations were sufficient. Instead, the report
noted that in order to qualify as a B reorganization, “it is necessary that the
acquisition be solely for voting stock and that no stock be acquired for cash
or other consideration.”79 In the same vein, the report mentioned taxpayer
concerns about the use of old and cold stock in a B reorganization. In these
situations, an acquirer may already hold stock of the unrelated corporation,
having purchased it earlier without reference to any future reorganization.
In such cases, taxpayers worried that the IRS might argue that nonvoting
stock consideration had been used in the purported B reorganization.80
Rather than amend the B reorganization rules to alleviate these concerns,
Congress granted nonrecognition treatment to reverse triangular mergers.
Legislative history indicates that Congress enacted reverse triangular
mergers because it did not see any reason to allow triangular mergers in
one direction and not the other, nor did it see any reason to limit the
consideration paid to target shareholders solely to stock. Again, Congress
seems to have been in search of consistent tax rules for similar transactions,
although strangely, it chose to pursue this goal through the addition of new
provisions, rather than the harmonization of existing ones.
If we accept consistency as the motivation behind the legislature’s
various amendments to the law governing acquisitive reorganizations, the
technical requirements for forward and reverse triangular mergers are
particularly bizarre. Because they are mergers, both transactions must meet
the requirements applicable to A reorganizations.81 In addition, each has its
own peculiar description.82
In a forward triangular merger, the acquirer transfers stock to a
subsidiary. The subsidiary uses that stock to acquire “substantially all” of

76

S. REP. NO. 91-1533, at 2.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E) (2012). For instance, the target may have important licensures or contracts
in place that would not survive in a forward merger. OESTERLE, supra note 20, at 172–73.
78
S. REP. NO. 91-1533, at 2.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See §§ 368(a)(2)(D) (describing forward triangular mergers), 368(a)(2)(E) (describing reverse
triangular mergers).
82
Id. §§ 368(a)(2)(D)–(E).
77
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the assets of the target in a merger transaction.83 Congress’s adoption of the
“substantially all” test is not surprising here. The test usually applies to C
reorganizations, and the functional result of a forward triangular merger is
the same as that of a triangular C reorganization. When the transaction is
complete, the target’s shareholders own stock of the acquirer, which holds
stock of a subsidiary in which “substantially all” of the target’s assets are
lodged. Unlike C reorganizations, however, forward triangular mergers do
not require the acquirer to use voting stock.84
In a reverse triangular merger, a subsidiary of the acquirer merges into
the target.85 The acquirer’s subsidiary stock is extinguished and replaced by
target stock in the merger. Following the merger, the target must hold
“substantially all” of its assets, as well as “substantially all” of the assets of
the merged subsidiary.86 The target stock is then converted to voting stock
of the acquirer.87 After the transaction, the acquirer must have shares
representing statutory control over the target.88
The structural result of the reverse triangular merger is identical to the
B reorganization.89 At the conclusion of the deal, former target shareholders
own shares of the acquirer, which owns shares of the target. Unlike the B
reorganization, however, the reverse triangular merger is subject not only
to the control requirement, but also to a requirement that the target retain
“substantially all” of its historical assets, as well as “substantially all” of
the merged subsidiary’s assets.90 And there is a second important
difference. In a B reorganization, even a small amount of nonstock
compensation paid to target’s shareholders is fatal to nonrecognition, but a
reverse triangular merger qualifies for favorable treatment under the
permissive A reorganization rules, which allow a substantial amount of
such compensation.91 This discrepancy does exactly what Congress sought
to avoid with its many amendments to the reorganization provisions: it

83

Id. § 368(a)(2)(D).
Id.
85
See id. § 368(a)(2)(E).
86
Id. § 368(a)(2)(E)(i).
87
See id. § 368(a)(2)(E)(ii).
88
Id. Once again, control in this context means “ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the
total number of shares of all other classes of stock” of the target. See id. § 368(c).
89
This assumes, of course, that all B shareholders agree to tender their shares in the B
reorganization. The problem of “hold-out” B shareholders in a stock acquisition is a significant
planning disadvantage.
90
Compare § 368(a)(1)(B), with id. § (a)(2)(E).
91
Compare I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), with id. § (a)(2)(E). See also BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note
72, at 12-93 (“[A] limited amount of other consideration . . . will not destroy reorganization status under
this provision, whereas it would be fatal if the transaction had to meet the requirements for a Type B
reorganization.”).
84
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allows (or forces) similarly situated taxpayers to recognize different tax
results arising from similar transactions.
Congress’s road to triangular mergers, while paved with good
intentions, failed to provide consistency, reduce complexity, or focus on
substance over form.92 Professor Ginsburg described the law as “an
anthology of some of the most difficult interpretative problems” of
reorganization transactions, creating “an extraordinary fabric of
interdependent qualifications that defies simple application or
administration.”93 Professors Bittker and Eustice wrote, “[T]he substantive
differences between these variations on the triangular-merger technique are
slight, the surviving corporation’s identity being the principal technical
distinction, so that form continues to play a dominant role in this corner of
the reorganization area.”94 Congress’s elevation of form over substance is
bizarre, particularly since all acquisitive reorganizations share defining
characteristics outside of their form, and since it has long been the IRS’s
policy to penalize taxpayers who elevate form over substance in other
areas.95
II. OVERLAP AND INCONSISTENCY CREATE ARTIFICIAL HURDLES
IN ACQUISITION PLANNING
A. Advantages of Triangular Mergers
Before recommending liberalization of the taxation of triangular
mergers, let us establish that these transactions are more than mere tax
gimmicks. The first substantive advantage of triangular mergers is
protection of the acquirer’s assets from the target’s creditors.96 A second
advantage is that the approval of a mere majority of the target shareholders
will permit the acquirer to gain total control of the target.97 Third,
92

As Professors Bittker and Eustice have noted, “There is a similar conflict of jurisdiction within
the reorganization provisions themselves, since, to take but one example, a statutory merger may be
indistinguishable in results from an exchange by one corporation of its voting stock for all of the assets
of another corporation; however, different statutory rules are prescribed for these functionally
equivalent types of reorganization.” BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 72, at 12-13.
93
Ferguson & Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 185.
94
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 72, at 12-53. In particular, the forward triangular merger and the
triangular B reorganization, and the reverse triangular merger and the triangular C reorganization
produce identical structural results. 2 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 72, at ¶ 803.[5], 61 (describing
overlap between reverse triangular merger and B reorganization).
95
See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 572–73 (1978); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465, 470 (1935); David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2012);
Altria Grp., Inc. v. United States, 658 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2011); BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523
F.3d 461, 477 (4th Cir. 2008); True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1999).
96
OESTERLE, supra note 20, at 64–65. See also United States v. BestFoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)
(discussing parent liability for subsidiary environmental liabilities).
97
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251 (2001).
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ownership of the target’s assets and liabilities “vest” in the acquisition
subsidiary “as a matter of law.”98 Thus a party to a “personal” contract with
the target or in a contract subject to an express anti-assignment clause may
not avoid the contract even if the target does not survive the merger.99
There is also no need to execute new title for registered assets of the
acquired company: real estate deeds, leases, title documents for vehicles,
and, in many cases, government permits and licenses. Finally, the fourth
advantage, available in some deals, is absence of parent shareholder voting
and appraisal rights.100 These planning advantages are substantively
important to business and justify liberalization of tax rules applicable to
triangular mergers.
B. Triangular Merger Rules Are Complex and Lack Tax Neutrality
The awkward evolution of the tax rules on triangular mergers––now
the most popular deal structure––has led them to unduly discriminate
between triangular mergers and direct mergers, and between forward and
reverse triangular mergers. One important goal of nonrecognition in the
reorganization context should be tax neutrality. For triangular mergers, this
means that tax considerations should not affect the choice between straight
and triangular forms or between forward and reverse forms of merger.
When the Code treats these forms differently, disparate treatment should
reflect normatively relevant differences among the forms.
The merger rules fail tax neutrality in multiple ways. First, straight A
reorganizations are not subject to the substantially-all test, but triangular
mergers are. As a consequence, an A reorganization may be preceded by a
spinoff or the target’s redemption of shares, but the same measures are
extremely difficult in the forward and reverse transactions despite all three
transactions being mergers under state law.101 Although one might justify
use of the test in the forward triangular merger because the resulting
structure is identical to that produced by a triangular C reorganization (to
which the substantially-all test would regularly apply), this logic cannot
extend to the reverse triangular merger, which produces a structure
identical to a B reorganization. Furthermore, if one looks only at the end
result of the transaction rather than the procedure used to get there, the
straight A and C reorganizations are identical in many cases, since the
acquirer obtains assets of the target, while target shareholders receive stock
of the acquirer. Consequently, if Congress were creating law by analogy to
existing forms, the substantially-all test should apply to both the straight A
98

See, e.g., id. §§ 261, 269.
See, e.g., Imperial Enters. v. Fireman Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287, 292–93 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding that a company’s insurance policy remained valid after a merger).
100
E.g., Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 668 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that parent
corporation’s shareholders lacked dissent and appraisal rights in subsidiary’s merger).
101
See GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 39, at § 801.2.
99
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and the straight C reorganizations, or to neither.102 In either case, it makes
little sense to apply it in the triangular merger context but not in the context
of the straight A reorganization.
A second example of nonneutrality comes from the application of the
control test to reverse triangular mergers but not to forward triangular
mergers. The statutory definition of the reverse triangular merger requires
the acquisition subsidiary to acquire “control” of the target in exchange for
parent voting stock or its own voting stock.103 This limits payments of cash
or cash equivalents, debt instruments, and other consideration; they cannot
be used to acquire more than 20% of the target stock. Moreover, the
acquirer must exchange its voting stock for 80% of each class of nonvoting
stock of the target.104 The same limitations do not apply to the forward
triangular merger or to the straight A reorganization. The consideration
used in those forms is limited only by the much looser COI requirement.105
Although this disparate treatment may stem from the reverse triangular
merger’s similarity to a B reorganization, which employs a similar control
test and produces the same structure, the resemblance is incomplete. If
Congress meant to treat the reverse triangular merger in the same manner
as a B reorganization, the regulations should not require acquirers to gain
all 80% of the target’s vote and value in the merger, but the B
reorganization allows for creeping acquisitions,106 whereas the reverse
triangular merger does not.107 We can think of no normative reason why
preownership of target stock would be permitted in one context and not the
other.
A third disparity between forward and reverse triangular mergers
relates to the parent’s basis in the subsidiary stock at the conclusion of the
deal. Planners using a reverse triangular merger have an advantage; they
can elect between two rules for the parent’s basis in the target stock if the
transaction can also qualify as a B reorganization or a § 351 contribution.108
The parent may either elect to treat as its basis the basis of its stock in the
102

If Congress is truly concerned with the acquirer’s level of asset acquisition, perhaps the
requirement should apply to both A and C reorganizations. Including it will prevent parties to
acquisitions from seeking nonrecognition status for mergers that are actually divisive, such as the one
described in Rev. Rul. 2000-5. See Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436 (a transaction that qualified as a
merger under state statute but which divided target assets between two acquirers was not a merger for
federal purposes).
103
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E) (2012).
104
Id. § 368(c).
105
Id. §§ 368(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(D).
106
For a discussion of creeping B reorganizations, see BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 72, at 7-24.
107
See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(j)(3)(i) (as amended in 2010). In some cases, though, a creeping
reverse triangular reorganization will be tested as a forced B reorganization and may receive
nonrecognition treatment if it meets the definition of § 368(a)(1)(B). See GINSBURG ET AL., supra
note 39, at § 803.1.
108
See Treas. Reg. § 1.358-6(c)(2)(C)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
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acquisition subsidiary, increased as though the parent had acquired the
target’s assets directly and contributed them to the subsidiary (standard
treatment in an asset acquisition), or it may instead choose as its basis the
basis of its stock in the acquisition subsidiary increased by the target
shareholders’ bases in the converted shares.109 This election is limited in
scope and often outweighed by the restrictions on use of consideration
other than voting stock. Nonetheless, it represents yet another discrepancy
between the two triangular merger forms.110
A fourth example of nonneutrality stems from the use of LLCs in
corporate acquisition transactions. Section 368’s acquisition provisions are
form driven and confined to transactions between corporations. The real
world, however, is not similarly confined. A number of states now permit
mergers between corporations and noncorporate forms.111 These
developments in state law, combined with the Treasury’s decision to
disregard the existence of single-member LLCs that make no check-thebox election,112 have opened up a new form of triangular transaction:
merger with a disregarded entity.113 In these transactions, the acquirer forms
a single-member LLC (for tax purposes, this entity is disregarded as merely
an extension of the acquirer),114 and the target merges into the disregarded
entity. For state purposes, the disregarded entity is a separate person, and
the acquirer is protected from liabilities of the target, just as in other
triangular transactions. For federal purposes, the disregarded entity is
invisible, and the target is merged directly into the acquirer.115 Under § 368,
the transaction is a straight A reorganization and not subject to additional
requirements applicable to forward and reverse triangular mergers.116 The
ability to conduct a triangular merger without resort to the triangular
merger rules in these cases further highlights the way in which § 368’s
dependency on form reduces tax neutrality and increases complexity.117
By distilling the history of tax treatment of reorganizations to its
essence, we find rules that have struggled to keep up with acquisition
109

Id.
Although, from a normative and theoretical standpoint, granting such an election in the context
of a forward triangular merger raises fundamental questions about respect for corporate personhood,
from the practical perspective of a transactional attorney, there may be no obvious reason for granting
the election in one context and not the other.
111
See OESTERLE, supra note 20, ch. 2.
112
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (2012).
113
See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-36-005 (Sept.
6, 2002).
114
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2010).
115
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-36-005.
116
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) ex. 2.
117
The disregarded entity merger rules themselves are plagued by nonneutrality. According to the
regulations, the transaction can proceed only in one direction: a merger of target into the acquirer’s
disregarded entity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(iii) ex. 6.
110
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practice over the years. Tax law irrationally penalizes reverse triangular
mergers by significantly limiting the forms of consideration that an
acquirer can offer the target’s shareholders; however, it does not similarly
penalize the forward triangular merger. And the penalty for using any type
of triangular merger rather than a straight merger—application of the
substantially-all test—not only creates nonneutrality among merger forms
but is also redundant in light of the IRS’s interpretation of “merger,” which
prohibits nonrecognition for divisive transactions.118 In short, federal tax
law has failed to keep up with the evolution of state corporate law on
acquisitions.
III. A PRAGMATIC RESPONSE
The problem created by complexity and overlap within the
nonrecognition laws is not only costly but also seemingly intractable. For
this reason, we suggest two responses: one pragmatic and one that raises
normative questions about the nonrecognition scheme generally. The goal
of our pragmatic proposal is not to address the theoretical underpinnings of
current tax law. Rather, we propose changes that are explicitly pro-deal in
that they resolve all classification conflicts in favor of tax-preferred
treatment for the deal. In essence, the approach favors stock-swap
triangular deals under the theory that cash is dear and that immediate tax
recognition in such deals would stop many at the margin. Here, we assume
a properly functioning capital market where corporate acquisitions will not
occur unless they leave most interested parties in a better position than they
would have been absent contracting. We also assume that removing
barriers to corporate acquisitions will be Kaldor–Hicks efficient and
therefore social welfare increasing.119 We recognize that these assumptions
may not hold true for any particular corporate acquisition, but we assume
that they are true when applied to such acquisitions in the aggregate.
A. Important Predecessor Proposals
We are not the first to recognize that the current state of reorganization
law is suboptimal, and the failure of prior attempts to improve this area of
the law demonstrate the difficulty of the task. In the mid-1980s, Congress
attempted a substantial overhaul of the federal taxation of corporate
reorganizations. A senate report observed that the “‘law’ consists of a
series of rules, some statutory and others of judicial origin, which, when
taken together, lack consistency, are unnecessarily complex, and are often

118

See Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436 (a transaction that qualified as a merger under state
statute but which divided target assets between two acquirers was not a merger for federal purposes).
119
A transaction is Kaldor–Hicks efficient if the gains of those who are made better off could be
used to fully compensate those who are made worse off. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 17–18 (8th ed. 2011).
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subject to manipulation.”120 The report could find no policy justification for
the different consideration (cash or stock) requirements between A, B, and
C reorganizations.121 Additionally, the complexity of the regime and the
lack of clarity in important terms, such as “substantially all,” concerned
Congress.122 Congress also raised concerns that the law incentivized
reorganizations for trivial noneconomic reasons and led to corporate
manipulation.123 As a result, Congress wanted to eliminate artificial
distinctions and disparate rules in the taxation of acquisitive
reorganizations.124
Congress proposed substantial revisions to the reorganization rules. In
1983, the Staff of the Senate Committee on Finance issued a preliminary
report that identified problems and proposed changes,125 such as giving
corporations more latitude in nonrecognition transactions.126 Additionally,
the initial report proposed repealing “elaborate definitional rules” in § 368
while providing relief from related judicial doctrines and proposed a
reclassification of corporate reorganizations.127
In 1985, the Staff of the Senate Committee on Finance issued a final
report, which closely tracked the 1983 report, along with a proposed bill.
The report noted that the “bill consolidates, simplifies, and makes uniform
the rules classifying corporate mergers and acquisitions, whether treated
under current law as a ‘reorganization’, a liquidating sale under section 337
of the Code, or a section 338 stock acquisition.”128 The most sweeping
change proposed by the committee was the repeal of § 368. The committee
sought to replace corporate mergers and reorganizations under § 368 with
“qualified acquisitions,” which were either a transaction or series of
transactions where one corporation acquires stock representing control over
another or a merger or consolidation or any other transaction where at least
70% of the gross fair market value of assets and 90% of the net fair market
value of assets were transferred.129 The proposal addressed many of the
inconsistencies described above and gave corporations structural flexibility
in tax-preferred reorganizations. While hailed by commentators, it never

120

STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 99TH CONG., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985, at 37
(Comm. Print 1985).
121
Id. at 38.
122
Id. at 38, 39.
123
See id. at 38.
124
See id. at 39.
125
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 1–2, 55–81 (Comm. Print 1983).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 55.
128
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 99TH CONG., supra note 120, at 50.
129
Id.
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left the committee.130 Similarly, an ALI proposal from the early 1980s that
would have made nonrecognition elective did not gain traction in the
legislature.131
1. A Modest Proposal.—Prior attempts at sweeping change have met
with difficulty in the political process, so perhaps a more modest proposal
is needed. Because most nonrecognition acquisitions are conducted as
triangular mergers, a proposal need not amend the entirety of the
nonrecognition scheme in order to effectively neutralize negative tax
effects on popular forms of stock swap deals. Thus, our initial proposal
does not advocate for repeal of § 368. Rather, it urges Congress to decouple
tax treatment of shareholders from that of the target corporation and to
move away from continuity of interest and continuity of business enterprise
tests toward a bare control test in triangular mergers. We first address the
treatment of shareholders under § 354 and § 356. We then address
application of bare control test to the target.
B. Decoupling Shareholder Nonrecognition from
Target Nonrecognition
Under current law, shareholders of a target corporation are entitled to
nonrecognition treatment only if the target is party to a reorganization.132
The statutory definitions of reorganizations, however, have become
increasingly arbitrary due to transactional ingenuity, allowing taxpayers a
de facto election of either reorganization or recognition treatment.133 For
this reason, and because modern law views the corporation as a separate
taxpayer, we argue that there is no normatively significant difference for
130

See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 72, at 12-15, 12-16 (praising proposal’s grant of
nonrecognition treatment regardless of the type of consideration used to pay for the deal while noting
that the proposal “vanished into the ether”). Cf. Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations:
Purging Penelope’s Web, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1395–405 (1985) (noting that the committee’s
proposal would leave a substantial amount of complexity in place, and among other problems, it would
be susceptible to creative planning by taxpayers).
131
See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER’S STUDY
ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 24–50 (1982) (proposal A1 would allow taxpayers to elect to treat
acquisitions as either cost-basis acquisitions or carry-over basis acquisitions). For two ends of the
spectrum of scholarly debate, see Yariv Brauner, A Good Old Habit, or Just an Old One? Preferential
Tax Treatment for Reorganizations, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1, 3–4 (proposing complete repeal of Section
368), and Glenn E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Mandatory Uniform Rules,
44 TAX L. REV. 145, 183 (1989) (proposing mandatory nonrecognition for transfers of “an entire
business activity”).
132
See I.R.C. § 354 (2012).
133
COI and COBE requirements apply only to the merged corporation. Their application to the
target can be easily avoided by merging the acquirer into the target or through use of Section 351. For
examples of these transactions, see GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 39, at §§ 610.8, 610.9, 611.1. In this
vein, Professor Coven has argued that § 368’s rigid definitions create transactional electivity. See
Coven, supra note 131, at 156 & n.36.
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tax purposes between stock-for-stock or securities-for-securities swaps
either within or without a reorganization. Both may be conceptualized as
like-kind exchanges or involuntary conversions.
The appropriate treatment of shareholders who exchange stock of a
target for stock of an acquirer depends upon the proper conceptualization of
stock. This, in turn, is inseparable from one’s conceptualization of the
corporation. In other words, how the government should tax exchanges of
stock depends on whether stock is merely a property interest (an entity
view), or whether stock denotes participation in a collective endeavor,
representing both an ownership interest in, and the right to make decisions
about, the management of an underlying corporation’s property and
opportunities (an aggregate view).134
When a shareholder’s ability to influence corporate decisionmaking is
negligible (let us call this the “ineffectual shareholder”), the entity view of
the corporation is appropriate. The ineffectual shareholder’s ownership of
stock represents investment in a piece of property, the value of which may
appreciate, but it does not connote inclusion in a collective endeavor. For
the ineffectual shareholder, stock is merely property, so it stands to reason
that nondistribution actions taken by the corporation should have no tax
consequences to the shareholder. In contrast, if a shareholder has the ability
to influence corporate decisionmaking (let us call this the “influential
shareholder”), the aggregate view of corporations may be more appropriate.
The influential shareholder exerts influence over property and opportunities
of the corporation, either alone or as part of an influential group. Because
an influential shareholder’s stock connotes not only property ownership but
also participation at the corporate level, it may be appropriate to attribute
actions of the corporation to the shareholder for tax purposes.135
The dichotomy between the ineffectual and influential shareholders is
somewhat artificial. State law enables corporations to create a spectrum of
shareholder rights and responsibilities, and these two groups represent both
ends of that spectrum. We need not draw lines of demarcation between
them, though, because nonrecognition treatment is justifiable at either end
by analogy to nonrecognition transactions that are not reorganizations:
involuntary conversions and like-kind exchanges. When a shareholder has
no practical influence over a merger decision or votes against it, the
conversion of target shares into acquirer shares is not a voluntary
transaction. Rather, it is an involuntary conversion that happens purely by
operation of law, regardless of the ineffectual shareholder’s consent or lack

134

For further discussion of aggregate versus entity views of the corporation, see DANIEL N.
SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 10–11 (2009).
135
We readily acknowledge that, if taken to its logical conclusion, this assertion represents an
endorsement of corporate integration in many instances.
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thereof.136 Like a person receiving nonrecognition treatment after losing
property to a natural disaster or eminent domain,137 the ineffectual
shareholder did not intentionally alienate her target shares and acquire
replacements. As a consequence, it would make little sense to impose a tax
on her receipt of replacement property. In contrast, an influential
shareholder may affect the decision to merge, and so, the aggregate view of
corporations supports treatment of the exchange of shares as a form of likekind exchange, similar to those described by § 1031.138 The influential
shareholder has willingly exchanged one capital venture for another,
similar capital venture. Just as in like-kind exchange, it may make little
sense to tax the influential shareholder on the receipt of replacement shares,
as she has not severed any profit from her capital.139
The analogies are not misplaced. Section 354, which grants
nonrecognition to target shareholders who receive acquirer stock in § 368
transactions,140 produces a result that mirrors tax treatment of involuntary
conversions and like-kind exchanges. A shareholder’s gain is taxed only to
the extent that she receives cash or other property, and she takes a
transferred basis in her replacement shares.141 Favorable treatment is
limited, though, by § 354’s cross-reference to § 368’s reorganization
definitions.142
We question the necessity of this limitation. Because the conversion of
target shares into acquirer shares can happen over the objection of the
ineffectual shareholder, it is difficult to attach normative significance to the
categorization of the underlying transaction as being either a
nonrecognition transaction or a taxable one. An ineffectual shareholder
who receives acquirer shares in exchange for target shares is similarly
situated in either a taxable or a nontaxable merger. For this reason, we
argue that § 354 should be extended to cover ineffectual shareholders
whose target shares are exchanged for shares of an acquirer even in a
taxable merger.
A similar rationale may apply to influential shareholders, who may be
viewed as collaborators in the corporate enterprise. If they vote against the
merger but lose, their stock is involuntarily converted. If they vote for the
136

For the tax treatment of involuntary conversions, see I.R.C. § 1033. Contract law may provide
an argument that the purchase of shares represents advance consent to the transaction since provisions
of the charter and bylaws are binding on the shareholder. Here, we focus on actual consent to the
specific transaction.
137
Id.
138
See id. § 1031.
139
We are willfully ignoring the thorny realization questions that might be raised by borrowing
against the increased value of capital, since they are discussed elsewhere and are tangential to our
project.
140
See § 354.
141
Id. § 356.
142
See id. § 354(a)(1) (nonrecognition provided to “a party to the reorganization”).
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merger, they have volunteered to exchange one capital investment for
another of related character. Unless they receive cash or other property,
influential shareholders have not severed any profit from their capital
investment, just as in a like-kind exchange. And if they have severed profit
from their capital through the receipt of cash or other boot, realization and
recognition are required. This reasoning applies regardless of whether the
merger is taxable or qualifies as a reorganization, yet nonrecognition
treatment is currently only afforded in the context of a reorganization. As a
result, § 354’s reliance on § 368’s reorganization definitions produces
disparate treatment for similarly situated shareholders. This discrepancy
may be cured by extending nonrecognition treatment to all shareholders
who exchange target stock for acquirer stock in any merger, regardless of
its compliance with § 368.
In sum, the consequences of the merger, rather than its form, should
trigger nonrecognition treatment of target shareholders’ gain upon receipt
of acquirer stock. Those shareholders continue to hold a residual claim in
the productivity of the assets transferred, albeit diluted by the other assets
of the acquirer. If a shareholder has consented to the merger, the
continuation of a shareholder’s investment establishes a serviceable
analogy to like-kind exchanges. If a shareholder has not consented to the
merger, the forced conversion of the shareholder’s target stock into
acquirer stock is analogous to an involuntary conversion. In either case, it
makes little sense to either grant or deny nonrecognition treatment on the
basis of whether the target will, itself, be taxed in the merger. The nontax
result for the shareholder will be the same, regardless of whether the target
pays any tax in the deal.
C. Nonrecognition of Target Gain and Loss
There are a variety of ways in which the triangular merger statutes
might be amended with respect to nonrecognition by the target. Here we
propose an approach meant to facilitate transactions by loosening the rules
and increasing tax neutrality between merger forms.
In most triangular mergers, the target’s assets vest in the acquisition
subsidiary, and the consideration, whether stock or boot, is paid directly to
the target shareholders.143 In most cases, the target recognizes neither gain
nor loss on the exchange.144 Similarly, neither the parent nor the acquisition
subsidiary recognizes gain or loss on the exchange.145 The acquisition
subsidiary normally takes a carryover basis in the target assets equal to the

143

A target that receives and retains consideration other than stock will be taxed on gain to the
extent of the retained consideration. See id. § 361(b)(1). For that reason, a target will generally prefer
distribution over retention.
144
See id. § 361.
145
See id. § 1032.
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target’s basis.146 The parent’s basis in the subsidiary stock is stepped up by
the net inside basis (basis less liabilities assumed) of the target’s assets.147
In reverse triangular mergers that also qualify as a B reorganization or a
§ 351 contribution, however, the parent may opt to step up the basis in its
subsidiary shares by the amount of the target shareholders’ basis in their
target stock.148 If one believes that continued existence of the target in
either of those transactions has no normative implications for the basis
determination, this election should be available in forward triangular
mergers as well.
Modifications suggested here also would affect nonrecognition by the
target and the target’s subsidiary. To create parity of nonrecognition among
the various mergers permitted in § 368, Congress should eliminate the
requirement that the surviving subsidiary hold “substantially all” of the
assets of the target. Furthermore, it should eliminate the enhanced control
test (the 80% rule) applicable to reverse triangular mergers.149 The
“substantially all” requirement is redundant in light of the IRS’s
interpretation of “merger,” which prohibits nonrecognition in divisive
transactions.150 Furthermore, the control test as applied to reverse triangular
mergers creates nonneutrality among merger forms and imposes a harsh
restriction on the use of nonvoting stock as consideration.151
There are also a number of rules that apply to both forward and reverse
triangular mergers that seem odd at best. First, the COI test has morphed
into a consideration test and is duplicative of § 368’s consideration
requirements for triangular mergers. Second, the IRS has held that a
target’s redemption of its own stock before the closing does not count
toward the “control test” but does count for the “substantially-all” test, a
position which unnecessarily increases the law’s complexity.152 Finally,
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See id. § 362(b).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.358-6(c)(2)(i) (2012).
148
See id. § 1.358-6(c)(2)(ii).
149
See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
150
See Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436 (a transaction that qualified as a merger under state
statute but which divided target assets between two acquirers was not a merger for federal tax
purposes). Furthermore, the “substantially all of the assets” test has been stripped of much of its original
meaning. Sale of fifty percent of the assets of the target, either before or after the reorganization, does
not violate the test so long as the cash remains within the structure. See Rev. Rul. 2001-25, 2001-1 C.B.
1291; Rev. Rul. 88-48, 1988-1 C.B. 117. Since the target is taxed on such sales, there is no tax
advantage from a part sale, part merger acquisition. Even if the target distributes this cash before or
after the merger, the distribution is taxable, so the IRS may eventually loosen the cash retention
requirement.
151
Although the control test also applies in the context of B reorganizations, acquirers may gain
control or maintain it using old and cold stock in those transactions, whereas the use of old and cold
stock is not permitted in a reverse triangular merger. See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(E), (c) (2012).
152
See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(j)(6) exs. 2 & 3 (T shares redeemed using cash of T are not counted
for purposes of the control test); Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 § 3.01 (redemptions, extraordinary
147
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there is considerable overlap among triangular mergers and stock or asset
acquisitions (B and C reorganizations), and there are cases in which
forward or reverse triangular mergers that do not qualify under their
specific subsections in § 368 may still qualify as B or C reorganizations.153
Triangular mergers may also overlap with acquisitions conducted through
§ 351.154
Under the approach in this subsection—that of seeking minimal
damage to the basic reorganization structure of the Code—the essence of
nonrecognition at the target level in current law rests on two distinctions:
the distinction between a deal that is an acquisition and one that is not (a
naked purchase and sale of capital), and the distinction between a stock
swap and a cash acquisition. Cash acquisitions, under traditional principles,
are not tax-preferred reorganizations. Accordingly, nonrecognition statutes
for triangular mergers should quickly and unequivocally distinguish stock
swaps from cash deals and acquisitions from nonacquisitions.155
A pared-back version of the control test for both forward and reverse
triangular mergers would do both jobs well and cleanly.156 Moreover, the
control test should be the same for both forward and reverse triangular
mergers. If, once the deal closes, the parent has exchanged its stock for
some sensible measure of legal control of the target, the parent has
purchased control in a stock swap. Anything more could be acquired using
other forms of consideration. There is no need for the fading COI or COBE
tests or for the “substantially all” test given the fact that shareholders are
taxed currently on the receipt of nonstock consideration in a nonrecognition
transaction and given the IRS’s refusal to recognize divisive mergers under
state law as mergers for federal tax purposes.157
In corporate law, just as in tax, there are multiple definitions of
control. In the reorganization context, one could argue that a legal control
test, resting on the percentage of stock necessary under state law to elect a
dividends, and payments to dissenters are considered when determining whether substantially all of the
assets have been transferred).
153
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-25, 2008-1 C.B. 986 (where the target in a reverse triangular merger
liquidates into the acquiring parent, the transaction will be tested as a C reorganization).
154
For instance, the “horizontal double-dummy technique” may provide nonrecognition treatment
in some instances where the requirements of Section 368 would not be satisfied. See GINSBURG ET AL.,
supra note 39, at § 904.
155
The ALI has recommended that reorganization treatment be expressly elective. We note that our
use of a bright-line test would create a transactional elective for most taxpayers. See AM. LAW INST.,
supra note 131. Nonetheless, the notion of an express election is intriguing and could apply to both
approaches we suggest in this Article. We take no position on its merits here, as our focus is clarifying
nonrecognition rules applicable to triangular mergers.
156
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
157
See I.R.C. § 354 (2012) (nonrecognition provided to target shareholder for receipt of acquirer
shares, but not for receipt of other consideration, in § 368 acquisition); Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B.
436 (transaction categorized as a merger by state law was not a merger for federal purposes because the
transaction was divisive).
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majority of the target’s directors, should suffice.158 Or, in the alternative
one could use a control test that rests on the percentage of stock necessary
under state law to pass fundamental changes to the target’s business
structure, such as amendments to a company’s charter, a merger, an asset
sale, or dissolution. One could also argue that the target’s nonvoting
common stock ought to be added to the test, which would require a
percentage of the target voting stock to be matched by a similar percentage
of all equity (or equity minus nonvoting preferred stock) by total value.159
Including nonvoting stock in the measure of control would prevent the
parties to a reorganization from covertly dividing the target through a
creative use of nonvoting shares.
IV. A NORMATIVE RESPONSE
As an alternative to the pragmatic control test described in Part III, we
offer a second approach, one that is characteristically not pragmatic and has
different normative goals. Through the lens of realization as it relates to an
entity view of corporations, the proposal’s normative goals include
elevating substance over form, loosening federal ties to state corporation
laws, and modernizing nonrecognition by robustly conceptualizing
corporations as entities rather than aggregates of shareholders.
In his influential article, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism,
Steven Bank argued that nonrecognition treatment afforded to mergers is
an embodiment of the compromise between consumption and accretion
views of the income tax.160 Early advocates of a consumption-type income
tax believed that growth of capital should not be taxed, while advocates of
an accretion-type income tax believed that growth of capital should be
taxed currently.161 Realization and recognition requirements of the Code
struck a balance between these positions by requiring taxation of growth,
but only when a taxpayer severs it from the original investment.162

158

This calculus should include dilution by all outstanding convertible and derivative instruments.
The legal control test would require an absolute majority of the outstanding stock. An “effective
majority” would require a smaller majority that, in light of the dispersal of the shares, is enough to win
voting contests that require a majority of those who actually vote at shareholder meetings.
159
A 1999 Treasury proposal would have conformed the definition of control in Section 368 to that
in Section 1504. See Am. Bar Assoc. Section of Taxation, Comments on Proposed Section 368(c)
Definition of Corporate Control, 83 TAX NOTES 1357, 1357 (1999). Section 1504(a)(4) excludes
certain nonvoting preferred shares from the definition of “stock” for purposes of determining whether
corporations are part of an affiliated group. See Jerome Tannenbaum, Nonvoting Stock for the
Consolidated Return, 29 TAXES 679, 679 (1951).
160
See Bank, supra note 16.
161
Id. at 45–51.
162
Id. at 67–69.
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Nonrecognition in the merger context may be conceptualized as a part of
that compromise.163
Viewing § 368 in light of that compromise reveals an alternative
approach that Congress might have taken in the context of corporate
acquisitions. This approach is built on three points. First, a more robust
espousal of the entity view would have separated the question of
shareholder nonrecognition from that of target nonrecognition. Second, a
more robust view of realization and recognition could have led Congress to
draft § 368 not by legislating particular deals, i.e. the merger, stock swap,
and asset acquisitions, but instead by identifying aspects common to all
deals that are relevant to realization and recognition. Third, if Congress had
focused less on form and more on substance, it could have taken a
normative approach ex ante rather than a remedial approach ex post to
address the evolution of corporate acquisition practice.
A. Prioritizing the Entity View
The structure of § 368, which has remained essentially unchanged
since the 1930s,164 reflects a less-than-robust conception of corporations as
entities separate from their shareholders. This is expected, since ideas about
income and corporations were unsettled in the income tax’s early years.165
Rather than making separate inquiries into whether shareholders and the
target should pay tax, § 368 focuses on the form of the entire transaction,
asking when the transaction as a whole justifies nonrecognition for all of
the parties. But under modern law, shareholders and corporations are
independent actors, and outside of the reorganization context, the
recognition of income by one generally does not implicate the other.
1. COI Should Not Be a Factor in Target Nonrecognition.—The
triangular merger rules’ (indeed, all of § 368’s) embodiment of an
incomplete conception of the entity view of corporations is not without
consequences. For instance, continued application of COI requirements,
which require a portion of the target’s shareholders to become acquirer
shareholders,166 reflects the idea that a corporation is an aggregation of its
shareholders rather than a separate entity. Were tax law to view the
corporation solely as an entity separate from its shareholders, there would
be little need to insist on this form of continuity. Under an entity view,
Shareholder A, who receives acquirer stock in exchange for target stock, is
in the same financial position postmerger regardless of whether
163

See id. at 73. In theory, reorganization merely changes the form of a taxpayer’s investment
rather than removing it from the market; therefore, it may be an inappropriate time to levy tax.
164
Id. at 12.
165
See Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 57; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the
State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1225 (2004).
166
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1) (2011).
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Shareholder B does the same.167 Put more generally, an individual
shareholder’s economic position is not directly affected by the identity of
other shareholders postmerger. The same is true for the target. Its identity,
assets, and contracts in place are not legally dependent upon the identity of
its shareholders. Requiring continuity of Shareholder B’s interest in the
target postmerger makes little sense as a bar to Shareholder A’s
nonrecognition, unless one believes that corporations are aggregates of
their shareholders. While one may argue that the identity of the corporation
is bound up in the identity of its shareholders, and that the target ceases to
be itself when a significant number of its shares change hands, by law, the
target is something more than an aggregation of shareholders, and its
existence does not depend on their identity.168 A stronger conception of the
corporation as an entity counsels against the use of COI as a bar to
shareholder nonrecognition.
COI is also irrelevant to target nonrecognition. A target corporation is
a separate person under state law and can act independently of its
shareholders in most instances. Its business is not tied to their identity,
except perhaps in the case of closely held businesses. In a merger, its
contracts may remain in place and it may continue to act in the market as a
going concern. At the moment of the merger, its assets remain in
productive association with one another, even though the identity and
number of its shareholders have changed.169 The COI requirement makes
little sense in this context. The question of whether the target has
experienced realization should equate to whether the target has severed
growth or loss from its capital. Rather than focusing on COI, recognition
should attach to actions that disassemble the target’s business or cash out
its investments. Here, the COBE requirement, or the requirement that an
acquirer obtain substantially all of the target’s assets, makes more sense
than the COI requirement.
B. Focusing on Realization
Congress also might have taken a different approach to § 368 if it had
focused more heavily on realization. In asking how a stronger emphasis on
realization would affect separate tests for shareholder and target
nonrecognition, we refer to our shareholder analysis in Part II.B and accept
the premise that realization is appropriate when a taxpayer has severed
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It goes without saying that the shareholder remains concerned with its percentage ownership in
the underlying entity.
168
The argument that corporate identity depends on the identity of shareholders was refuted in J.E.
Seagram Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 75, 103 (1995) (“[W]e must look not to the identity of the
target’s shareholders, but rather to what the shares represented when the reorganization was
completed.”).
169
See supra Part II.A.
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gains or losses from the assets that generated them.170 Sale by a corporation
of a single asset for cash obviously would result in realization. In contrast,
if one corporation merges into another newly formed corporation
containing no assets, and the acquirer disposes of none of the acquired
assets, but continues to operate the target as though no merger had
occurred, then realization is not appropriate. This is because the acquisition
has not resulted in withdrawal of any of the target’s gains from capital or
its productive capacity from the market. But what about the range of
examples that fall between these two extremes? A merger is rarely in either
of these two categories, and a nonrecognition regime must distinguish an
asset sale from the continuation of a target’s business.
One way to distinguish between the sale of some of the target’s assets
and an acquisition of the target itself is to focus upon an embodiment of the
target that is not governed by its formal incorporation under state law.171
There is a particular deployment of assets, employees, and opportunities
that make up the target corporation and which might be acquired
wholesale. That deployment will be different for each target, and it does
not depend upon the formalities of state law. In other words, tax law should
ask whether the acquirer has purchased some of the target’s assets, or
whether it has acquired the target itself—that unique collection of attributes
that make the target a business. Consider Professor Shaviro’s description of
a corporation as having “a kind of internal character and arc of
continuously unfolding historical development that no individual can easily
alter.”172 This language clearly depicts a unique entity, the essence of which
might be carried into an acquirer, and the existence of which does not
depend upon state formalization.
It is the transfer of this “essence” of target that should be the hallmark
of nonrecognition for the target. In a qualifying acquisition of the target,
the cognizable essence of the target is transferred to an acquirer. Although
the target shareholders have alienated their interests, gains and losses of the
target have not been severed from the capital or productive capacity that
generated them, and while the target’s formal identity may not survive the
acquisition, the going concern of the target (not simply a pile of assets, but
a deployment of assets and opportunities for the production of profit) will.
Forcing recognition in this circumstance would be inappropriate for many
of the traditional reasons given for nonrecognition in corporate
acquisitions, such as federal aversion to taxing paper gains, or the creation
of cash flow problems for a target, the assets of which are fully deployed or
illiquid. Furthermore, when an asset is sold following a merger, the sale is
170

See Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 55 (defining realization as a transaction “which changes the
taxpayer’s relationship to the asset”).
171
For instance, Professor Coven has suggested providing nonrecognition to “the transfer of an
entire business activity.” See Coven, supra note 131.
172
See SHAVIRO, supra note 134, at 10.
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fully taxable.173 Where the target transfers its entire self in a corporate
acquisition, it has not changed the relationship of its assets nor severed gain
from them by changing their deployment. It has, instead, changed its
relationship with its shareholders, which should not be a taxable event.
Still, a tax-based conceptualization of the corporation is elusive.
Describing the essence of a corporation without resort to state-level
formalities pushes toward ephemera, and a standard such as we have
described is unworkable. By its very nature, the essence of a target is
beyond statutory comprehension and any attempt to capture it would give
the government immense discretion while giving taxpayers negligible
guidance. There are, however, second-best alternatives. For instance, a
strong showing of continuity of business interest or transfer of a substantial
going concern could both serve as signals that the target survived
acquisition even though its formal existence may have been extinguished.
We do not seek here to fully describe such a test but raise it as the logical
endpoint of our normative inquiry.
C. Placing Substance over Form
As described above, Congress’s adoption of a more robust view of
realization and of the corporation as an entity rather than an aggregate of its
shareholders could have led it to draft § 368 by identifying aspects
common to all deals that are relevant to realization and recognition. For
instance, in all nonrecognition acquisitions, shareholders receive some
substantial level of equity in the acquirer, providing a basis for
nonrecognition of shareholder gain where stock is traded for stock. And in
all nonrecognition acquisitions, the going concern embodied by the target is
preserved in some form at the time of acquisition, providing a basis for
nonrecognition of target gain.174 Focus on the fundamental underpinnings
of realization reveals that nonrecognition of the shareholders need not
correspond to nonrecognition of the target. Furthermore, in a reimagined
nonrecognition regime, focusing on realization would lead to substancebased rather than form-based rules. Section 368 embodies a transactional
elective available through compliance with or departure from clearly
defined rules, allowing acquirers to vary the substance of their transaction
from its form. A standard based on fundamental notions of realization,
however, would focus solely on substance, asking whether a taxpayer
(either the shareholder or the target) has severed gain or loss from its
underlying investment. This inquiry would decouple federal tax law from
transactional forms given by state law or invented by innovative counsel.175
173

See I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
See, e.g., Fed. Reg. § 1.368-2 (as amended in 2010) (describing continuity of propriety interest
and continuity of business enterprise requirements).
175
State law would still limit transactional forms and procedures. Federal tax law, however, has
different goals than those of state corporate codes. State codes authorize corporations to enter into deals
174
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A substantive test as described above, applied separately to the target and
its individual shareholders, would accomplish this goal. Only when form
and procedure are relevant to realization of the particular taxpayer at issue
should they be relevant to nonrecognition.
CONCLUSION
Over the past one hundred years, federal tax law on reorganizations
has failed to keep up with the evolution of state law on mergers and
acquisitions. The most popular modern acquisition form, a triangular
merger, still remains an afterthought in the evolution of tax law on
reorganization. The ubiquitous use of triangular mergers demands that tax
doctrine on the acquisition type be reexamined and reformed.
Yet by peering into the Pandora’s box of tax-preferred reorganizations,
one must necessarily grapple with the most fundamental issues of an
income tax. What is (or ought to be) “income”? What principles are behind
the nonrecognition of income? How does one reconcile nonrecognition in
some cases with recognition in others? What role should state law play in
the development of federal law? What justifies the fiction of corporate
personhood, and should we continue or contest the double taxation of
corporate profits?
When asking why the forward triangular reorganization is treated
differently from the reverse, or why either of these acquisitions is treated
differently from a straight A reorganization, deep questions emerge.
Among them is why the form of these transactions matters when
determining whether shareholders or corporate parties to the transactions
should be entitled to nonrecognition. This question, in turn, implicates form
not only in the reorganization context, but also in the corporate tax more
broadly. At the heart of the deepest problems in § 368, we find the fiction
of corporate personhood juxtaposed with the fact of going concern, the
conflict between aggregate and entity views of the corporation, and the
false legislative presumption that corporate tax is born by the
corporation.176
The intertwined nature of state and federal law in the reorganization
context has created fundamental problems. Federal respect for corporate
personhood and forms of transactions between corporate persons has
implicitly imported myriad state laws into the federal tax context. In a
system where state law governs the form of transactions and in which form
matters, the federal government is required to adjust for the novel use of
old forms or the creation of new ones. It must do this because it has taken
and specify how corporate authority is exercised and divided among boards of directors and
shareholders. These goals are only tangentially related to the goal of taxing “income” in the context of
the corporate acquisitions.
176
See Adam H. Rosenzweig, A Corporate Tax for the Next One Hundred Years: A Proposal for a
Dynamic, Self-adjusting Corporate Tax Rate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1029 (2014).
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form as the starting point of its assessment and because the federal
government does not, itself, govern form. And because there are fifty states
and only one federal government, it is unrealistic to expect the federal
government to keep pace in a form-based regime. It is also unrealistic to
expect it to comprehend and account for normative considerations each
time a novel form appears.
Congress has sought consistency in this exercise, sometimes at the
expense of normative coherence. In dealing with the evolution of form in
state law, therefore, the federal government has often created rules by
analogy. As a result, the rules applicable to triangular mergers are doubly
hidebound, containing an unnecessary amount of complexity and overlap.
If, over the past one hundred years, Congress, the Treasury, and the
IRS had viewed the taxation of corporate acquisitions as a question of
substance—namely, whether realization had occurred and whether
recognition was justified—rather than a question of form, the
reorganization statute might look very different.177 Congress may have,
instead, chosen statutes that are minimalist and communicate core
normative positions on the identity of income and the role of entities in an
income tax system. This would have decoupled the taxation of
reorganizations from innovations of state law, relieving pressure on the
federal government to constantly amend within the constraints of existing
law.
This leads us, then, to our final recommendation. In its next one
hundred years, Congress should strive to pry the corporate income tax free
from state laws on corporate personhood and governance, focusing not on
form, but instead deciding on substance what income is, to whom it should
be attributed, and when it should be taxed.

177

We also note the profound effect double taxation has on the question of nonrecognition and
leave that issue for another day.
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